November NDI Poll: Satisfaction with Georgian Dream

This professionally done poll (see the National Democratic Institute web site) is remarkable in showing broad satisfaction with the Georgian Dream government, contrary to my anecdotal impression and probably contrary to what NDI expected. There is a startling extent of felt improvement in pensions, which 66% see as better, health care (44%), and in a broad range of issues involving democracy and civil liberty: 43% felt there had been improvement in freedom of speech since October 2012, 59% in fair elections, 41% in "prisons and prisoners, 38% in "human rights and 31% in media independence.  

Accordingly, the "refused to answer percentage, always important in the former Soviet Union, is miniscule (although higher in the overtly political questions). Under National Movement rule, more refused; there was more fear. As the NDI press release says, "For the first time since NDI began polling in Georgia in 2008, a majority of respondents, 54%, say that Georgia is a democracy now. The figure stood at 44% in the previous survey three months earlier.

An American would expect the temporary "honeymoon of a winning political party to be over or waning after fourteen months, but Georgian voters react differently. Sixty-one per cent of a representative national sample now consider the newly victorious Georgian Dream Coalition to be "the party closest to them, a rating almost identical with its share of votes for Parliament in the landslide of October 2012. Anticipating his resignation, liking for Ivanishvili soared even higher, to 74%, while only 11% of the national sample disliked him, a figure that virtually coincides with share of support given to the formerly ruling National Movement. His nominee as Prime Minister, the 31 year old Irakli Garibashvili, is liked by 71%, disliked by 10%. The new President, Giorgi Margvelashvili, was little known until his campaign but has improved his popularity by 12 points, to 72%, since September.

Ex Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili still has the highest rate of 74% , according to NDI poll. Photo by N. Alavidze

More striking even than the popularity of Georgian Dream is the unpopularity of the National Movement that ruled the country for nine years. Only 9% said the National Movement was "the party closest to them. Its supporters are a distinctive, embattled group with perceptions different from those of most people. One question NDI asked was whether crime had increased since Georgian Dream came to power. Nationally, 21% of the general sample said it had, but 50% of UNM supporters perceived that it had. The National Movement does not face extinction, like Gamsakhurdias party or Shevardnadzes, but at a consistent popularity of around 10% since losing power it does risk political irrelevance; it will be extremely difficult to recover power except in a coalition. The great fear that the Georgian Dream leadership still has of a National Movement comeback seems misplaced.

Of the 46 public figures NDI asked about, the seven most disliked belonged to the National Movement, constituting its top leadership except for Davit Bakradze, whose popularity has hovered around the same respectable level (47-48%). Former President Saakashvili, who bestrode Georgian politics like a colossus for nearly a decade but is now in self-exile, is now liked by 24%, disliked by 56%.

For the country, there is a prospect of single-party dominance as in Japan since 1955. Such an outcome would not be fortunate for Georgian Dream, because it will lack the vigorous competition that stimulates and renews a partys appeal to the public. The Georgian Dream coalition parties will face the temptation to slacken their efforts to build party organizations separate from the state, a temptation that could eventually be fatal to them. Fortunately, 82% of the national sample, and 81% of Georgian Dream supporters, think that a "strong opposition is important. This poll finding may owe much to conventions of democratic respectability; even educated people often do not emphasize the need for opposition in conversation. Certainly the support for opposition in the abstract does not translate into support for the National Movement as it now exists. With local elections coming in May or June, the unpopularity of local government might provide an opening for new initiatives in opposition.  

50% of the national sample rates the performance of the Georgian Dream coalition "well, 14% "very well. Only 6% rate the performance of the coalition "badly, showing how small-scale is last-ditch National Movement hostility. Citizens local governments, in contrast, are rated by 19% well, but only by 3% very well, and by 13% badly. In fact there are many regions, like Tetritskaro-Manglisi, Ninotsminda, Akhalkalaki, and Lagodekhi, where locally dominant groups simply hoisted new colors, shifting from National Movement to Georgian Dream without changing their habits, regarded by many locals as undemocratic, self-interested, or nepotistic.

Unemployment and social problems are still the top issues for the Georgia. Photo by N. Alavidze  

Continuing danger signals for the government, as for the UNM before it, are the answers on jobs and poverty. 12% think the situation with jobs is worse, only 7% that it is better (Question 2). In the similar question 11, 22% think there are fewer jobs than when Georgian Dream came to power, only 4% that there are more. But these percentages, worrying for the government, have improved since the NDI poll done in August/September, when 32% thought there were fewer jobs, 4% that there were more than in October 2012. In August/September, 20% had thought the situation with jobs was worse than it was at the change of power, 19% that poverty was worse. I suspect that the change in these answers is another manifestation of the diffuse feeling of satisfaction that the majority now has, because answers to the question "Do you consider yourself to be employed? have hardly changed in years; they were essentially the same when the National Movement ruled, with percentages in the mid- to upper sixties answering "No. In Akhaltsikhe region a remarkable 74% do not consider themselves to be employed, in Zugdidi region 78% do not.  

Question 9 asked whether you and your household are better or worse off. 15% said better off, compared to 11% in September, 10% worse off (14% in August/September). So the government remains highly vulnerable on the economy, but its vulnerability is declining somewhat due to overall satisfaction. When the National Movement ruled, there was chronic dissatisfaction for years due to the economy, but it remained latent, only became a serious political problem when it was joined by dissatisfaction over felt injustice. Georgians do not have high expectations of government. Nevertheless, Georgian Dream will eventually lose support unless the economy improves. The Coalitions support is very broad, but it is not intense. Seventy-three percent of the Georgian national sample think the new government is "making the changes important to you, but only 15% "completely agree. The electorates disappointment with the National Movement has reinforced its habitual post-Soviet caution in committing itself to any government.

Summing up satisfaction, Questions 10 and 13 ask very general questions that have become traditional in Western polling. 53% say Georgia is definitely or mainly "going in the right direction, a strong improvement from 39% in August/September. 73% think the Georgian Dream government is "making the changes that matter to you, a percentage that Western governments in prosperous democracies would envy. Only 20% disagree, a figure almost identical with the National Movement electorate in the October 27 Presidential election. The figures have, from Georgian Dreams point of view, improved since August/September, when 64% agreed, 30% disagreed. 24% think the Parliamentary opposition, that is the National Movement, would make these changes.

According to NDI poll, 73% think the Georgian Dream government is "making the changes that matter to you. Photo by N. Alavidze  

There are striking regional differences. Places with higher levels of disagreement that the government is making changes that matter to them are Kutaisi region 26%, perhaps because of the governments desire to move Parliament, Rustavi region 29%, and Zugdidi region 22% with 14% "dont know, the highest figure of all the regions specially surveyed (most were not). But there are other areas of National Movement popularity: Akhaltsikhe with 40% expecting the UNM would make the changes they want, the highest figure in the country (probably because Merabishvili, the former Prime Minister now in pre-trial detention, was a local boy), Ambrolauri with 35 % (where Burjanadze also did better than anywhere else), and Zugdidi with 32% and 26% "dont know, the highest percentage in the country.  

Zugdidi also had the lowest turnout in the country in the Presidential election. Mingrelians feel both dissatisfied and disfranchised, that their opinion wont be heard or doesnt matter. Samegrelo remains the biggest center of resentment against the government and the best base for a National Movement resurgence. With its high population density, and that of other western areas not specially surveyed (but not Batumi region where UNM is unpopular), it contributes to much greater hopes from the UNM in West Georgia (west of the Surami ridge, I believe). In the West 33% thought the National Movement would make the changes that matter to them, while only 15% do in East Georgia. Probably the National Movements score in East Georgia is dragged down by Tbilisi, the capital (over a quarter of the electorate), where the former governing party is very unpopular, and by ethnic minority regions that passively submit to whatever government is in power.

The biggest political event of the year, the then-impending resignation of Bidzina Ivanishvili, had little impact on these poll numbers. Seventy-nine percent approve of his choice of Gharibashvili as Prime Minister, only 8% disapprove. One might expect far more uncertainty, perhaps a sense of crisis, to meet Ivanishvilis resignation. The numbers contradict that; for the moment they confirm Ivanishvilis own expectation of continuity because he feels he is leaving the country in good hands. These numbers, like much of the overall high level of satisfaction, are surely premised on the fact that the largest group of respondents, 45%, think that Ivanishvili will continue to run things behind the scenes (extrapolating some from Question 93). Should this eventually prove not to be the case, as I would guess it will, the numbers may shift considerably. But no one knows what Ivanishvilis role will eventually be. What is clear is that the majority of citizens are happy with Georgian Dream for the time being.